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Notes and Comments
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE PRIVATE HOUSING
SECTOR: FIVE YEARS AFTER
"Five years have passed; five summers, with the length
Of five long winters."' I
INTRODUCTION
It has now been five full years since the major developments
of 1968 promised anew to end the widespread discrimination
against blacks seeking to rent or buy housing commonly available
to whites. The ringing words of the majority opinion in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.2 reaffirmed the nation's pledge of freedom
in the thirteenth amendment: "At the very least, the freedom
• . . includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy,
the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot
say that being a free man means at least this much, then the
Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot
keep."' 3 This opinion was rendered on June 17, 1968, two months
after enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968;1 judicial and
legislative processes thus combined to form extensive and defini-
tive national policy in the housing field, and that policy is a clear-
cut commitment to equal housing opportunities for all. Now,
after five years under these laws, discrimination in the housing
field is still both widespread and deeply rooted. Despite rapid
growth of citizens' fair housing organizations and their unwaver-
ing support of open housing policies, despite the federal laws and
enforcement mechanisms, despite the concurrent fair housing
laws in many states, despite the economic qualification of black
buyers and renters, discriminatory practices in housing are the
common-place rather than the exceptional, the frustrating but
predictable future for hopeful black buyers and renters.
Currently there are three main branches to fair housing law.
There is first the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. Section
1. W. Wordsworth, Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey, lines 1 and
2.
2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3. Id. at 443.
4. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 et seq. (1970)).
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1982, passed pursuant to the enforcement clause of the thirteenth
amendment and revitalized by the decision in Jones. Subsequent
decisions have reaffirmed the availability of this basic doctrine to
an aggrieved person and defined the nature of remedies available
to parties suing pursuant to it. Second, the Fair Housing Act of
1968, now 42 U.S.C. Sections 3601-3631 and commonly referred
to as Title VIII, which was passed in the spring of 1968 in the
aftermath of the death of Martin Luther King, Jr., embraces
widespread prohibitions and provisions for both administrative
and judicial remedies. And third, state law in Maryland prohibits
racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing and charges
the Human Relations Commission with administrative enforce-
ment. The relative strengths and weaknesses of these approaches
to discrimination will be evaluated in the following sections, with
particular emphasis on the efficacy of each in remedying the
wrong each is designed to remedy. In addition to evaluating the
present suitability of these laws to the housing discrimination
problem, this comment will focus attention on the adaptability
of these laws to the more subtle forms which discrimination is
now taking and will make suggestions as to how the legislature
and courts might best respond in the future.
SECTION 1982
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Decision in Jones v. Mayer
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 grants to all citizens the "same
right. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 5 For
many years this Act was interpreted to apply to only those situa-
tions in which state action was present6 and thus was not consid-
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1982. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every state and territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." The statute as presently codified
derives from the Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. For conflicting analyses of
the legislative history and the circumstances in which the Act was passed, see Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-37, 454-73 (majority opinion and dissenting opin-
ion of Mr. Justice Harlan). See also Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Prelimi-
naryAnalysis, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1294 (1969); Note, ConstitutionalLaw: TheEnd of Private
Racial Discrimination in Housing Through Revival of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42
U.S.C. § 1982), 6 TULSA L.J. 146 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the companion case to Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Both of these cases held that judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants in private conveyances was state action and therefore prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment. In Hurd, the Court seemed to assume without discussion that
section 1982 requires a finding of state action. 334 U.S. at 31-34. See also Corrigan v.
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ered to reach purely private acts of discrimination. In the Jones
decision, the Supreme Court characterized the question of statu-
tory construction as one of first impression' and then held that
the language did include acts of private discrimination.
The Jones case reached the Court on a stipulation that
respondents had discriminated against the Joneses solely on the
basis of their race.' The Court focused on the legislative history
of the Act and concluded that it ". . . bars all racial discrimina-
tion, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property,
and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the
power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment."' Al-
though the Statute is declaratory only, the Court held that its
broad equity power made injunctive relief appropriate" and left
open the question of whether damages were available in a suit
under this section."
The impact of the Jones decision cannot be underesti-
mated." The decision was announced only two months after Con-
gress had enacted a comprehensive fair housing act, yet the Court
was not deterred from proclaiming in the broadest terms its com-
mitment to judicial relief where access to and acquisition of prop-
erty is denied because of race.' 3 The Jones decision sets forth no
Buckley (1926), 271 U.S. 323 at 330-31; Note, Constitutional Law: The End of Private
Racial Discrimination in Housing Through Revival of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42
US.C. § 1982), 6 TULSA L.J. 146 (1970).
7. 392 U.S. at 419-20.
8. The plaintiffs responded to a newspaper advertisement for homes in a new devel-
opment built and owned by defendant. When plaintiffs selected a building site and house
plan, defendants refused to sell to them because they were black. See 255 F. Supp. 115
(E.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd, 379 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1967). The Court of Appeals decision, written
by the now Mr. Justice Blackmun, suggested that a housing development of the magni-
tude of defendant's project could be found to be carrying out a governmental function and
thus could be engaged in state action; the court declined to adopt this reasoning, however,
as inappropriate for an "inferior tribunal." 379 F.2d at 45.
9. 392 U.S. at 413.
10. Id. at 414.
11. See text accompanying note 15 infra.
12. The Jones decision elicited extensive commentary in legal periodicals. See, e.g.,
Denno, The New Fair Housing Law: 1866, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 491 (1969); Kinnoy, The
Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Company, 22 RUTG. L. REV. 149 (1968); Levine, An Evaluation of an Appropriate
Legislative and Judicial Response to Discrimination in Housing, 11 So. Tax. L.J. 295
(1970); Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HAav. L.
Rav. 1294 (1969); Note, Open Housing-A Reality in 1968?, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 149
(1968); Note, Constitutional Law: The End of Private Racial Discrimination in Housing
Through Revival of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1982), 6 TULSA L.J. 146
(1970); Note, The Prohibition of Private Discrimination in the Rental or Sale of Real
Property, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 88 (1970).
13. Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, would have dismissed the writ as improvidently
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exceptions: as applied to housing, every unit in the nation is
covered whenever a black desires to rent or to buy. The federal
courts are thus open to any black seeking immediate injunctive
relief for discrimination in the housing area. Subsequent cases
indicate that the Court's decision has been valuable in fair hous-
ing litigation, as the broad interpretation of section 1982 has
given relief in situations where, even with the sweeping provisions
of Title VIII, relief otherwise would not have been available.'4
The Supreme Court and other federal courts have taken up
some of the questions left open after the Jones decision. For ex-
ample, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, the Court held that a
party injured by violation of Section 1982 could indeed recover
damages.'5 In addition, courts have allowed plaintiffs to maintain
suits under both Section 1982 and Title VIII without an election
of remedy,' 6 and one federal district court has held that even if
relief under Title VIII is barred by the statute of limitations, it is
still available under section 1982.'1 It thus appears that the fed-
eral courts are committed to an expansive interpretation of Sec-
tion 1982's and that a plaintiff seeking relief need not look primar-
ily to Title VIII.
granted following passage of the Fair Housing Act. 392 U.S. at 477-78.
14. See notes 15 through 17 infra and accompanying text.
15. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). See also notes 34 through 49 and 123 through 125 infra and
accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972), rev'g
446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971); Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.
1970); Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp.
1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
17. See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1035-37, (N.D. Tex. 1971) where, al-
though suit under section 3612 was barred, the district court proceeded under section 1982.
18. Five circuits have extended by analogy the statutory interpretation of Section
1982 to the parallel provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) pro-
vides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
See Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d. Cir. 1971)
(private employment contract); Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970) (right to make
a contract for admission to a private recreation facility); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) (private employment contract); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970)
(private employment contract); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972)
(private employment contract). See generally, Larson, The Development of Section 1981
as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv. CIrv. RIoTrrs-Civ.
LIB. L. Rav. 57 (1972).
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Section 1982 Subsequent to the Jones Decision
A review of the cases adjudicated after the Jones decision
indicates that the courts have not yet sought to narrow the scope
of Jones,'" nor have they been deterred from recognizing discrimi-
nation, even in its more subtle forms. Thus it may be inferred
that courts will be forceful and determined in fashioning relief.
Additionally, the courts have recognized several evidentiary
methods available to plaintiffs seeking to establish that discrimi-
nation has taken place. For example, the court may allow the
plaintiff to establish certain facts which, if unrebutted, would
sustain an inference of racial discrimination. Once these facts are
proven, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer evidence in
rebuttalY' Thus, the burden rests on the defendant to show that
his actions were not discriminatory, rather than on the plaintiff
to show that these actions were.
This technique apparently was used in Newbern v. Lake Lor-
elei, Inc.2 In that case, plaintiff claimed that racial discrimina-
tion was the only factor in defendant's refusal to sell one of ap-
proximately 1200 lots in a recreational development. Defendant
countered with an explanation of its procedure in considering the
qualifications of potential buyers and demonstrated rejection of
sixty other applications for one of three stated reasons. The court
rejected this explanation, saying that the evidence instead indi-
cated that defendant had in fact rejected applications only when
the deposit check was returned or when some other indication of
unsatisfactory credit came to defendant's attention. Relying on
19. "A narrow construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent
with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. ... Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969).
20. For a similar legal analysis, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
noted in 31 Mn. L. REv. 255 (1971). In this case, the Court held that where employment
practices, including intelligence tests, operate in such a way as to discriminate against
-blacks, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant company to show that the questioned
practice or test is related to job performance; if the company is unable to demonstrate
this relation, the practice must be discontinued because of its discriminatory conse-
quences, even absent a discriminatory intent. 401 U.S. at 431-32. The shifting of the
burden of proof thus results in a more objective test than a subjective inquiry into discrim-
inatory intent. See also Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375
F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967), aff'g 251 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1966) where the court of appeals,
quoting the district court opinion, stated: "Where no Negro physicians are on the hospital
staff and application in proper form is made . . . by a Negro physician who meets the
'paper' qualifications . . . a prima facie inference of discrimination exists. ... 375 F.2d
at 654, quoting 251 F. Supp. at 673. The court of appeals concluded, "[Tihe inference
disappears when a reasonable explanation is given showing that denial of staff member-
ship is not because of the race . . . of the applicant." Id.
21. 308 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
19731
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this evidence, in addition to defendant's misleading statements
explaining the lengthy delay, the court held that if a black offeror
meets the objective requirements of the seller-developer and if the
developer has sold lots, but none to blacks, a prima facie infer-
ence of discrimination arises "as a matter of law.""2 The defen-
dant was enjoined from selling to anyone else the lot previously
selected by the plaintiff and was ordered to deal with all persons
on equal terms in the future.
Another evidentiary technique gaining acceptance in the
courts is the use of "testers," a means employed primarily by
citizens' fair housing groups and designed to demonstrate to the
court that the denial of housing was made solely because of race.
It typically works as follows. The black applicant, thinking he
has been rejected on the basis of race, contacts a fair housing
group 23 and relates to them what has taken place. The group
supplies a white volunteer tester who is matched as closely as
possible to the black applicant in terms of age and marital, family
and financial status. The white tester then applies for the same
housing unit, and if the unit is made available to the white, after
the black has been told it is not available, a prima facie case of
racial discrimination has been established. 4
On facts such as these, a district court in Massachusetts
held: "I find that the refusal . . . to rent . . . was purely and
solely because the [plaintiffs were] members of the black race,
and I rule that the refusal to rent . . . to [plaintiff] is a clear-
cut and unequivocal violation of the plain terms of 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1982. .... ,,21 Similarly, in Bush v. Kaim25 the court considered
22. Id. at 417.
23. In Baltimore, for example, Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc., founded in 1959, has
sponsored tester programs available both to verify alleged discrimination through the use
of a white tester and to establish the prevalence of discriminatory housing practices
through the use of matched black and white tester teams. See Baltimore Neighborhoods,
Inc., Discrimination Against Blacks in Predominantly White Apartment Developments,
July, 1972.
24. See Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
25. Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1969). The court ordered
defendants to execute a one year lease to plaintiffs at the advertised rental terms.
26. 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969). In this case, the court, upholding the plain-
tiff's right to lease the property, ordered the defendant to execute a lease to the plaintiff
under terms identical to those offered the tester. The landlord and tester had actually
executed a lease (which contained a clause prohibiting assignment or subletting, although
the tester apparently planned to assign it to the plaintiff at a later time). The court,
stating that it is "not of critical significance ... and, indeed, may not even be relevant,"
refused to give the lease the importance the parties had accorded it. The court held that
denial of plaintiff's right guaranteed by § 1982 was more important than the lease issue
and could not be made to depend on state law of contract or property. Id. at 160.
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the use of a tester as persuasive evidence in meeting plaintiff's
burden of proof and held that plaintiff had established a prima
facie case and that the burden had shifted to the defendant.2 7
Denial of housing is not the only conduct found illegally dis-
criminatory in suits brought under Section 1982. In Contract
Buyers League v. F & F Investment," plaintiffs, black home buy-
ers in an area where apparently all sales were being made to
blacks, alleged inter alia that Section 1982 was violated by the
terms and conditions on which their properties were sold to them
because these terms were less favorable and the prices higher
than those given whites. Defendants attempted to meet this alle-
gation by saying that since in fact no sales had been made to
whites, there could not have been any discrimination in the
terms. Against a complex factual background and allegations of
blockbusting, panic selling, and exploitation of black buyers, the
court held that "there is no reason to distinguish a refusal to sell
on the ground of race and a sale on discriminatory prices and
terms." 9
Remedies Under Section 1982
Section 1982 remains today an important statement of fed-
eral policy and a viable statutory basis for a civil suit. Lacking
the specificity and detail found in the more recent Fair Hous-
ing Act of 1968, 30 it is instead admirably broad and flexible, and
thus a suit brought under Section 1982 may avoid some of the
limitations and disadvantages of a Title VIII suit. While Title
27. "[Tihe plaintiff must show each of the following elements:
(1) that the owner (or responsible party) placed the property on the open market
for sale or rental, (2) that the plaintiff was willing to rent or purchase on the terms
specified by the owner, (3) that plaintiff communicated this willingness to the
owner at a time when the property was available for sale or rent, (4) that the owner
refused to sell or rent the property to plaintiff on terms which the owner indicated
would otherwise be satisfactory, and (5) that there is no apparent reason for the
refusal of the defendant to rent or sell the property to the plaintiff other than
plaintif's race."
The court also suggested ways in which the defendant could rebut the presumption. Id.
at 162.
28. 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd sub nor. Baker v. F & F Investment,
420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1970), noted in 80 YALE L.J. 516 (1971). In this case, black
homeowners who had bought homes on installment contracts formed the Contract Buyers
League and brought a class action for reformation of the contracts and modifications of
unjust terms. On appeal, the court held that the Contract Buyers League did not have
standing, as it was not the real party in interest, but that the suit could be maintained
by individual party plaintiffs. See also R. QUAEMMEN, To WALK THE LINE, a novel based
on the factual setting which gave rise to the Contract Buyers League case.
29. 300 F. Supp. at 216.
30. See discussion infra at note 51 and accompanying text.
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VIII has a short statute of limitations,3' section 1982 has none.
Title VIII limits the successful plaintiff's recovery to actual dam-
ages and "not more than $1,000 punitive damages,"3 but section
1982 affords no such obstacle. And Title VIII limits recovery of
attorney's fees to the plaintiff unable to pay,3 while again section
1982 has no such constraint. Courts have recognized these advan-
tages of section 1982 and have made use of common law theory
in fashioning relief, including monetary damages and attorney's
fees.
In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 3 the Court relied in part
on 28 U.S.C. Section 1343 (4)35 and on 42 U.S.C. section 1988,3
and in part on prior decisions, to allow damages to both white and
black plaintiffs for defendants' violation of section 1982. Citing
Bell v. Hood37 and Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Rigsby,3 the Court
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970) requires that a section 3610(a) complaint be filed
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory act. Under section 3612, a civil action
similarly must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). Actual damages include the cost of finding compara-
ble housing, the differential in price between the housing withheld and the housing substi-
tuted, and any other amount justified as direct compensation for the injury suffered.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, are payable only for wilful behavior, the intent of
which is to deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp.,
429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970), where the court stated that punitive damages would be
appropriate only if the defendant acted wilfully and in gross disregard for the rights of
the complaining party. See generally, W. PaossER, TORTS 9-14 (4th ed. 1971).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) authorizes payment of". . . court costs and reason-
able attorney fees in the case of a prevailing plaintiff: Provided, that the said plaintiff
in the opinion of the court is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees."
34. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970):
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in
the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws
are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted
to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable reme-
dies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction
of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with
the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern
the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal
nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
37. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
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stated: "The existence of a statutory right implies the existence
of all necessary and appropriate remedies."3 The Court con-
cluded, "The rules of damages . . . is a federal rule responsive
to the need whenever a federal right is impaired."4
Following the lead of Sullivan, other courts have responded
to the demands of the situation and have awarded payment of
damages and attorney's fees. In Brown v. Ballas,4" the court said,
"[I]njunctive or other affirmative relief may not provide an
effective remedy. . . Compensatory and possibly punitive dam-
ages would be the appropriate remedy." The court awarded
plaintiff $750 damages plus $500 for attorney's fees.4" Similarly,
in Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp. ," the defendant was ordered
to sell a building lot to plaintiff and to pay damages and attor-
ney's fees as well. Judge Wisdom stated that the court had a
41.*. duty to fashion an effective remedy to carry out the purpose
of the statute . . . . " and that an award of attorney's fees was
necessary ". . . to encourage private litigants to initiate such
suits."45 Citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.46 the
court also explained that ". . . in many cases there may be no
damages or damages [may be] difficult to prove. To ensure that
individual litigants are willing to act as 'private attorneys gen-
eral' to effectuate the public purposes of the statute, attorney's
fees should be available . . . . '" In Knight v. Auciello,48 the
court cast the award of attorney's fees in broad policy terms,
saying, "The violation of an important public policy may involve
little by way of actual damages. . . . In such instances public
policy may suggest an award of costs that will remove the burden
from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to vindicate the public
right. "41
Section 1982 thus offers the litigant flexibility both in char-
acterizing the conduct involved as discriminatory, and therefore
illegal, and in providing effective remedies and monetary com-
38. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
39. 396 U.S. at 239.
40. Id. at 240.
41. 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
42. Id. at 1037.
43. 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 145.
46. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
47. 444 F.2d at 148.
48. 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
49. Id. at 853.
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pensation to the plaintiff. 0 For these reasons section 1982 will
continue to play a prominent role in the national policy of equal
access to housing.
TITLE VIII: THE FAIR HOUSING ACT OF 19681'
Provisions of the Law
The scope of the substantive provisions of Title VIII is well
indicated by the language of the first section: "[I]t is the policy
of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States. 52 Except for cer-
tain types of dwellings which are exempt,5" the Act makes it
50. A court could, on a proper showing of wilful conduct, of an intentional denial of
housing rights, or of humiliation and suffering, order payment of a substantial amount as
punitive damages. See, e.g., Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Franza-
roli, 387 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970) noted in 118 U. PA. L. Rpv. 1263 (1970). In this
case, the state agency charged with enforcement of fair housing laws found that
defendant had refused to rent an apartment to a black complainant and ordered the
defendant to pay damages to the complainant, including an amount for "frustration,
anger and humilation." Id. at 312. The state supreme court upheld the Commission's
power to order such payment of damages and to obtain judicial enforcement of such an
order.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). For an interesting and readable account of the
circumstances in which this Act was passed see Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative
History and a Perspective, 8 WAsHBuRN L.J. 149 (1969). See generally Note, The Federal
Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L.J. 733;
Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of
the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HAiv. L. REv. 834 (1969); Note, Open Hous-
ing-A Reality in 1968?, 3 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 149 (1968).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1)-(2) (1970):
(b) Nothing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) shall apply to-
(1) any single-family house sold or rented by an owner: Provided, That such
private individual owner does not own more than three such single-family houses
at any one time: Provided further, That in the case of the sale of any such single-
family house by a private individual owner not residing in such house at the time
of such sale or who was not the most recent resident of such house prior to such
sale, the exemption granted by this subsection shall apply only with respect to one
such sale within any twenty-four month period: Provided further, That such bona
fide private individual owner does not own any interest in, nor is there owned or
reserved on his behalf, under any express or voluntary agreement, title to or any
right to all or a portion of the proceeds from the sale or rental of, more than three
such single-family houses at any one time: Provided further, That after December
31, 1969, the sale or rental of any such single-family house shall be excepted from
the application of this subchapter only if such house is sold or rented (A) without
the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services
of any real estate broker, agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or services of any
person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent
of any such broker, agent, salesman, or person and (B) without the publication,
posting or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation
of section 3604(c) of this title; but nothing in this proviso shall prohibit the use of
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unlawful to "refuse to sell or rent. . . or otherwise make unavail-
able . . a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion,
or national origin";54 to discriminate in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of the transaction;55 to indicate any preference in any
advertising;" to misrepresent the availability of a dwelling;" or
to "induce or attempt to induce" sales by representations of the
present or future racial composition of the neighborhood." Addi-
tional sections make it unlawful for lending institutions to dis-
criminate in the terms of or in the availability of financing59 and
attorneys, escrow agents, abstractors, title companies, and other such professional
assistance as necessary to perfect or transfer the title, or
(2) rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended
to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if
the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his resi-
dence.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970):
As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as exempted by
sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be unlawful -
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling
to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1970):
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1970):
(c) To make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling
that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation,
or discrimination.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1970):
(d) To represent to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling
is in fact so available.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970):
(e) For profit, to induce or attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling
by representations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neighborhood
of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion, or national origin.
This section prohibits what is generally termed "blockbusting".
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (1970):
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful for any bank, building and loan
association, insurance company or other corporation, association, firm or enterprise
whose business consists in whole or in part in the making of commercial real estate
loans, to deny a loan or other financial assistance to a person applying therefor for
the purpose of purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a
dwelling, or to discriminate against him in the fixing of the amount, interest rate,
duration, or other terms or conditions of such loan or other financial assistance,
because of the race, color, religion, or national origin of such person or of any person
associated with him in connection with such loan or other financial assistance, or
of the present or prospective owners, lessees, tenant, or occupants of the dwelling
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prohibit discrimination in the availability of or services of brokers
and their agents."
The Act provides three basic methods of enforcement. First,
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is charged with
administrative enforcement. Subject to deferral to the state
agency where state law provides equivalent rights and remedies,"1
any person aggrieved may file a complaint with HUD. 2 The
Secretary is then empowered to investigate and to "try to elimi-
nate or correct the alleged discriminatory housing practice by
informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. '6 3
If these efforts to conciliate fail, the aggrieved party may go to
federal court, without regard to the amount in controversy, to
enforce his rights.64 Second, substantive rights may be enforced
by suit in the federal district court, again without regard to the
amount in controversy, and in the proper circumstances the court
may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff." Finally, the Attorney
General is authorized to bring suit when he has reasonable cause
to believe either that there is a "pattern or practice of resistance
to the terms or rights of this Act," or that any group of persons
has "been denied any of the rights" guaranteed by the Act and
"such denial raises an issue of general public importance." 6
Regardless of the method by which suit is brought, the court
is authorized to enjoin the discriminatory practice and to provide
preventive relief. If the complainant went first to HUD, the court
may "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate."" If
the plaintiff went directly to court, he may in addition be
awarded "actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive
or dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance is to be
made or given: Provided, That nothing contained in this section shall impair the
scope or effectiveness of the exception contained in section 3603(b) of this title.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970):
After December 31, 1968, it shall be unlawful to deny any person access to or
membership or participation in any multiple-listing service, real estate brokers'
organization or other service, organization, or facility relating to the business of
selling or renting dwellings, or to discriminate against him in the terms or condi-
tions of such access, membership, or participation, on account of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a)-(b) (1970).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
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damages, together with court costs. '6 8
Despite the admirably broad scope of the Act, the inclusion
of brokerage and financial institutions, and the varied means of
enforcement, there are serious obstacles to quick and uniform
enforcement. Should the aggrieved party turn first to HUD, the
law requires a referral to the state agency if the state fair housing
law is considered by HUD to afford "substantially equivalent"
rights and remedies. Maryland's fair housing law, for example,
is deemed to have equivalent rights and remedies. Thus any
Maryland complainant contacting HUD, either by letter or by
toll-free telephone call to Washington, D.C., is requested to file
a complaint with HUD. The Washington office, then refers the
complaint to the regional HUD headquarters in Philadelphia,
which in turn forwards it to the State Human Relations Commis-
sion in Baltimore. This process takes an average of two weeks °
and clearly is not a suitable enforcement mechanism for anyone
facing a situation of some urgency. Further, it is not clear whether
HUD is empowered to revoke its determination of equivalency
and to resume jurisdiction if state funding and staffing are not
sufficient to provide equivalent enforcement. A complainant
could contact HUD; he could be referred to the appropriate state
agency, never again be contacted, and in the end be left without
any affirmative relief." This can hardly be said to offer an ade-
quate administrative remedy to aggrieved parties.
In addition to problems related to the inevitable delays built
into this remedy, the national policy depends for its administra-
tive enforcement on the cooperation and efficacy of state agen-
cies" which at present receive no federal funding. While a policy
68. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(c) (1970).
70. Interview with Philip J. Tierney, General Counsel, Maryland Human Relations
Commission, in Baltimore, Nov. 22, 1972.
71. See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971)
rev'd, 409 U.S. 205 (1972), where plaintiffs filed first with HUD, which referred the com-
plaint to the local agency, as required by Title VIII. The complaint was returned to HUD
since the local agency did not have adequate resources to handle it. HUD then notified
plaintiffs of its inability to obtain voluntary compliance, and plaintiffs brought suit in
federal district court. Id. at 1159-60 n.1.
72. Title VIII apparently was modeled after similar provisions in Title VII (employ-
ment discrimination). See generally Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal Sys-
tem: Proposals for a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171 (1965), for
an analysis of the use of state human relations commissions to implement and enforce
federal policy. Witherspoon's criticizes commission reliance on complaints filed by ag-
grieved parties rather than original investigation initiated by the commission; customary
limitations on the commission's enforcement powers; delay in investigation and failure to
process the complaint effectively; inability to preserve the status quo until final disposi-
19731
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of involving local agencies as much as possible to enforce the fair
housing provisions is desirable, embodying as it necessarily does
a state commitment to the same objectives, that policy offers
slight comfort to a complainant who turns to the federal govern-
ment, who is referred to the state, and who is unable to get
prompt remedial action from either.
Further, consider the procedure and result if the complain-
ant goes first to HUD, and HUD is unable to obtain voluntary
compliance. The Act provides that the party may then go to
court-something he could have done in the first place had he
been so inclined. A more effective provision would be either to
authorize HUD to go to court on behalf of the aggreived party,
or, even better, to empower HUD to issue cease and desist orders
if it concludes that discrimination has taken place.
The complainant can, however, bypass the administrative
procedure and elect to sue directly. But here he also faces obsta-
cles: he must obtain counsel familiar with the provisions of the
law, obtain such counsel quickly, and pay the legal fees. Aside
from the problems of adequate legal referral services and the
availability of counsel familiar with fair housing legislation, the
financial risk may be such as to inhibit the very type of private
suit that is needed to ensure broad-based private litigation to
enforce the Act.
The congressional policy in providing for a private right of
action is to place the power of enforcement in the hand of the
wronged. The concept of private attorney generals suing to enjoin
illegal conduct has been used by Congress in other areas73
where placing the entire burden of enforcement on the govern-
ment would virtually guarantee piecemeal enforcement, due to
the chronic problems of funding and staffing, and would slow
progress toward the expressed congressional goal. Thus, the pri-
vate right of action seems well calculated to broaden the means
of enforcement and to give any aggrieved person direct access to
and relief in the federal courts.
Since the plaintiff is vindicating national policy as well
as remedying the wrong to himself, he should recover his
tion of the complaint; reliance on conciliation, making it difficult to secure compliance;
and lack of verification of the extent of compliance.
73. This policy is expressed in the provisions for suits by "private attorney generals"
in, inter alia, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title
II, § 204, 78 Stat. 244, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) (1964), and in the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, Act of December 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304, 84 Stat. 1706,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-2 (1970).
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attorney's fees in all cases in which he prevails, 4 without regard
to ability to pay, as a matter of course. Additionally, the limit on
punitive damages should be removed, and the court should be
empowered to award damages in any amount justified by the
facts and circumstances of the case. 5 The real injury, the injury
this Act is designed to prevent, is the need to go to court at all to
enforce the basic right to housing, and some financial compensa-
tion for this injury should be authorized.
While the Act authorizes the Attorney General and the De-
partment of Justice to carry out investigations on their own initi-
ative, this provision's usefulness is clearly tied to the funding
provided for this purpose. Since investigation by the Department
of Justice may be particularly effective and suitable when pro-
ceeding against widespread financial or real estate practices, the
Act should make such investigation mandatory upon complaints
made directly to the Department in such specified areas and
should make the necessary funding mandatory.
Cases arising under Title VIII: private suits
Despite the limitations and problems of Title VIII, suits
brought by private citizens indicate an imaginative use of the
provisions of the Act. There are probably many suits seeking
injunctive relief which are then settled or withdrawn if a compro-
mise is reached or if the plaintiff finds housing elsewhere.'
74. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), where
the Supreme Court, in interpreting Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, said, "If
successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved
parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive
powers of the federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees...
to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief ....
75. In Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971), the court held that
damages were not appropriate under section 3610, but the court allowed damages under
section 1982. The suit had been brought under both sections. But see Williamson v.
Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972), where the court awarded
plaintiffs $500 each as punitive damages, plus $750 in attorney's fees. The suit was
brought under section 3612(c). Note also that the court rendered an opinion on March 27,
1972, approximately one month after the discriminatory conduct occurred. See also Note,
Jones v. Mayer; The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws,
69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019, 1037-40 (1969); Note, Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination v. Franzaroli, A Problem in Administrative Enforcement of Fair Housing
Laws, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1263 (1970).
76. See Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1970). In this case,
plaintiff brought suit after the defendant landlord refused to rent to him; defendant then
agreed to the rental, and asked that the suit be withdrawn as moot. The court of appeals
held that although the case was moot as to injunctive relief, the plaintiff still had a
maintainable claim for damages, and remanded for consideration of that issue. Id. at 572.
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Moreover, in addition to what might be characterized as the
"typical" use of the private right of action,77 the reported cases
also indicate use of the private right of action to enforce other
more sweeping provisions of the Act.
In the leading case of Brown v. State Realty Co.," citizens
brought suit alleging violation of the anti-blockbusting section."
Plaintiffs, white residents of the area,80 charged defendants, a real
estate broker and his agents, with making statements to several
neighborhood residents that the area was "going colored" and
with posting a "sold" sign which represented the home as sold
when in fact it was not. Defendants countered that no "block-
busting" had taken place as the neighborhood had, in fact, re-
mained calm.' The court, not receptive to this argument, held
that defendants had violated section 3604(e) in attempting to
induce residents to list with them. This opinion has had consider-
able influence on other district courts, which have followed its
broad reading of the statutory provisions, and indicates a general
policy of carrying out the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
Suits initiated by the Attorney General
The authorization in section 3613 for suits by the Attorney
General applies to two different factual settings. First, the Attor-
77. See Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102 (E.D. Wis. 1969), where the plaintiff
obtained an injunction against the defendant, preventing him from renting to anyone until
he complied with the terms of the Fair Housing Act, on the basis of differing terms and
representations made to the black plaintiff and to a white tester.
78. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
79. "Blockbusting" classically refers to the activities of outside speculators or real
estate agents who approach a vulnerable residential area, typically one of owner-occupied
homes where the residents are elderly and have a high equity in the property, and per-
suade them to sell directly to the speculator at prices substantially below the market price,
often at a considerable loss to the seller. Fear of a swift racial change in the neighborhood
is usually the main argument used by the speculator or real estate agent in inducing the
sale. The speculator then resells to the black buyer, who, unable to obtain decent housing
through normal channels, is only too happy to pay a high premium for owning a home.
The speculator thus makes great profits and justifies his activities by arguing that he is
performing a useful social function in making housing available to blacks when no one
else will. See Vitchek, Confessions of a Blockbuster, SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 14,
1962, at 58.
In recent years, blockbusting has become both less dramatic and less easily attacked.
The impact of the speculator has declined, as activities of his sort were made clearly
illegal; but the speculator has been replaced by mass solicitation by real estate agents,
whose efforts to induce panic selling and a complete racial turnabout are furthered by the
already-present fears of integration. See generally, Glassberg, Legal Control of
Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 145 (1972); Blockbusting, 59 GEo. L.J. 170 (1970).
80. Standing apparently was not an issue in this suit. For a discussion of standing
in general, see notes 115 through 126 infra and accompanying text.
81. 304 F. Supp. at 1241.
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ney General may bring suit whenever he believes, with reasonable
cause, that a person or group of persons is engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of resistance to the terms of the Act; second, he may
bring suit when a group of persons has been "denied any rights
guaranteed by this Act and such denial raises an issue of general
public importance.""2 The courts have accorded this section its
broad power by applying the provisions widely in terms of the
grant of authority to bring suit, and by broadly interpreting what
constitutes "pattern or practice" and what raises an issue of
"general public importance."
One of the first applications of this section was an attack on
blockbusting activities. 3 In United States v. Mintzes,s" one of the
earliest Title VIII suits of any kind, the Federal District Court of
Maryland considered whether the exemption of private homes
from the provisions of the Act (under certain conditions) would
be applicable to the blockbusting section and decided that it
would not. The court held that the section 3603(b) (1) exemption
applied only to section 3604(a)-(d), for the very sound reason that
blockbusting primarily injures private homeowners, and to ex-
empt them would be to deny protection to the very group most
likely to need this protection. s5
In Mintzes, the defendants, Baltimore real estate agents,
contacted several home owners on one street and advised them
to sell because of the "changing neighborhood." The court found
that this was a pattern or practice: "the number of incidents
necessary to show a pattern or practice depends upon the nature
of the right protected and the nature of the ordinary violations of
such right."86 Granting an injuction and retaining jurisdiction to
insure compliance, the court stated that the only intent required
was the intent to make the statement and that the requirement
"for profit" was met if the person hoped to gain as a result and
did not depend on an actual realization of profits."
The term "pattern or practice" has been construed in several
other cases. Courts have stated that "pattern or practice" are not
words of art; rather they should be given their generic meaning.8
82. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
83. See note 79 supra.
84. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
85. Id. at 1309.
86. Id. at 1314.
87. The court also upheld the constitutionality of this provision on thirteenth
amendment grounds, rejecting alternative grounds under the fourteenth amendment or
the commerce clause. Id. at 1312-13.
88. United States v. Reddoch, Civil No. 6541-71-P (S.D. Ala., Jan. 27, 1972) 25.
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In the leading case of United States v. West Peachtree Tenth
Corp."5 the court said that "pattern or practice" are not "magic
words" and that no mathematical formula is required to deter-
mine that a pattern or practice exists; rather, the determination
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case." In that
case, the defendant admitted that prior to the effective date of
Title VIII, his policy was not to rent to blacks. The evidence
indicated that after the effective date, this policy was not modi-
fied. A black applicant had been told that his "status" had not
changed after the Act became effective. The court held that a
showing of pre-Act discrimination, and of "little or no evidence"
of a post-Act change until suit was filed, supported a "strong
inference that the pre-Act pattern or practice continued after the
effective date of the Act . . . ."" The defendant had rented to
blacks after suit was filed, but the court stated that ". . . the
good faith and present disposition of the defendant to adhere to
the letter and spirit of the law does not preclude us from granting
relief . . ". . ' and entered an order requiring that for the next
two years defendant must report all applications and their dispo-
sition to the court.93
89. 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
90. Id. at 227.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 228.
93. The order reads in part as follows:
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
versus
West Peachtree Tenth Corporation d/b/a One Tenth Street Apartments, et al.
Defendants.
Pursuant to the Opinion and Mandate of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by this court that the
defendant, West Peachtree Tenth Corporation, its officers, employees, agents and
successors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them are
permanently enjoined from: (1) Failing or refusing to rent a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, or national origin and from making a dwelling un-
available to any person because of race, color, religion, or national origin; (2) Dis-
criminating against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of rental of a
dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because
of race, color, religion, or national origin;
(3) Making, printing, or publishing, causing to be made, printed, or published, any
notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
or national origin or an intention to make such preference, limitation, or discrimi-
nation; (4) Representing to any person because of race, color, religion, or national
origin that any dwelling is not available for inspection or rental when such dwelling
is in fact available.
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It is further ordered that the defendants shall forthwith adopt and imple-
ment the following affirmative program to correct the effects of their past discrimi-
natory practices:
(1) Within ten (10) days of this Order, defendants shall notify the following black
applicants for housing at One Tenth Street Apartments, by registered mail with
copies to counsel for plaintiff, that each is entitled to reapply for an apartment and
that any reapplication will be considered without regard to race or color:
ROBERT PITTS
SANDRA THREADCRAFT
(2) Within ten (10) days of this Order, defendants shall permanently post in a
prominent place in the rental office, or immediately outside the rental office, a
notice, clearly visible to applicants, stating that the One Tenth Street Apartments
will be rented without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.
(3) All advertising of apartments at One Tenth Street Apartments in newspapers
or other media, or in pamphlets, brochures, handouts, or writings of any kind, shall
include a statement to the effect that apartments are rented without regard to race,
color, religion, or national origin.
(4) The defendants shall forthwith fully instruct all of their full time and part time
employees with respect to the provisions of this decree and with respect to their
obligations thereunder. Within five (5) days of hiring of any new employees, defen-
dants shall provide each employee with a copy of this decree, explain its contents
to him, and advise him that he is subject to all the requirements contained therein.
(5) In the event that a firm, association, company, corporation or other person is
engaged by defendants to act as a real estate agent, referral agency, or otherwise
manage or promote rentals of apartments for the defendant, such firm, association,
company, corporation, or person shall be notified by defendant within (5) days of
its engagement that apartments are rented without regard to race, color, religion,
or national origin.
It is further ordered that, no later than fifteen days after the entry of this
Order, the defendants shall file with the Court, and serve upon counsel for plain-
tiff, proposed written objective nonracial standards and criteria (hereinafter re-
ferred to as standards or proposed standards) for the processing and approval of
applications for apartments at the One Tenth Street Apartments. It is suggested
that, in formulating proposed standards, the defendants consider the standards
approved by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
in United States v. Palmetto Realty Corp., C.A. No. 70-1419 (E.D. La., September
18, 1970) (See paragraph II c of decree and Policies and Procedures, Rules and
Regulations attached thereto).
The plaintiff shall have ten days after the filing of such proposed written
objective nonracial standards and criteria by the defendants to object to the same.
In the event plaintiff files such objections, this Court will hold a prompt hearing
with respect to the adequacy of the defendants' proposed standards, and with
respect to the merits of plaintiff's objections thereto, and will order the implemen-
tation of objective standards and procedures either as proposed by the defendants
or otherwise. Upon the entry of an Order providing / requiring the implementation
of objective standards and criteria, the defendants shall forthwith implement such
standards and criteria with respect to all applicants for apartments, without regard
to race, color, religion, or national origin.
If, following the entry of an order requiring the implementation of objective
standards, the defendants should elect to alter such standards for the processing
and approval of applications for apartments, by making changes therein which are
nonracial both in purpose and in effect, they shall promptly file such proposed
changes with the Court, with copies to counsel for plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall
have the opportunity to object thereto. Any dispute between the parties arising
from such proposed changes may be raised by either party in any subsequent
appropriate proceedings in this Court.
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Other decisions have followed West Peachtree and declared
that a "pattern or practice" has been established by proving a
pre-Act policy of discrimination and a failure to modify this pol-
icy after the effective date of the Act. In United States v. Real
Estate Development Corp."4 defendant's stated policy had been
to rent only to whites, and he had repeatedly refused to sign a
compliance agreement submitted by the housing officer of the
United States Air Force. These facts, together with a statement
It is further ordered that ninety days after the entry of this decree, and at three-
month intervals thereafter, for a period of two years following the entry of this
decree, the defendants shall file with this Court, and serve on counsel for the
plaintiff, a report containing the following information for the One Tenth Street
Apartments:
(a) The name, address and race of each person making inquiry about the
availability or terms of rental of an apartment during the preceding three-month
period, and whether such person:
1. Made inquiry.
2. Was offered an application.
3. Filled out an application.
4. Submitted an application.
5. Was advised with respect to earnest money and security deposit procedures.
6. Made a deposit.
7. Was accepted for a waiting list.
8. Was accepted for occupancy.
9. Was rejected, and if rejected, the reason or reasons therefor, and the specific
objective criterion which the applicant failed to meet.
The report shall also state the date on which each of the foregoing actions was
taken.
The reports filed pursuant to this Order shall also include a description of all
affirmative steps taken during each preceding reporting period in compliance with
this decree, including copies of letters to Negro applicants, copies of all signs posted
in accordance with this Decree, copies of all advertisements and brochures used by
the defendants (or sample copies of advertisements, together with the dates and
media in which they were published), and written documentation to the effect that
each employee has received a copy of this Order and has been advised of its terms.
The parties are directed to attempt to agree on simplified forms and procedures for
carrying out this reporting provision to assure minimum inconvenience to all parties
and to the Court.
For a period of two years following the entry of this decree, the defendants shall
maintain and retain any and all records which are the source of, or contain, any of
the information pertinent to defendants' obligation to report to the Court. Repre-
sentatives of the plaintiff shall be permitted to inspect and copy all pertinent
records of the defendants at any and all reasonable times, provided, however, that
the plaintiff shall endeavor to minimize any inconvenience to the defendants from
the inspection of such records.
The plaintiff shall recover of the defendants its costs.
The Court retains jurisdiction of this action for all purposes.
United States District Judge
94. 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
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that he "'rented to whom he chose,' 95 supported a conclusion
that his prior discriminatory policy had not changed and that
there is "no reason to believe that black men could rent an apart-
ment from defendant today. '9 6
A "pattern or practice" was adduced in United States v.
Reddoch7 from evidence that defendant had instructed his em-
ployees to discriminate against blacks in the rental of apartment
units and that blacks had not, in fact, been given the same infor-
mation as to the proper application procedures." The court, fol-
lowing West Peachtree, enjoined the defendant and entered an
affirmative action order.9
"Pattern or practice" suits have been brought against both
individual defendants and against several persons together
charged with a "group" "pattern or practice." Suits of the first
variety allege that the defendant engaged in conduct which ex-
hibits a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, and several cases
indicate that finding a "pattern or practice" will not be particu-
larly difficult. For example, in United States v. Gilman'0 two acts
of discrimination were found to constitute a "pattern or prac-
tice": one was a refusal to renew a lease after the white tenant
married a black, and the other was a statement to a white tenant
to send her friends to see an apartment if she "'made sure her
friends were white.' " The court interpreted the congressional
use of the words "pattern or practice" to mean only more than
an "isolated or accidental or peculiar event," and therefore any
showing of more than one such event could constitute the neces-
sary pattern or practice. 0°
In the leading case charging defendants with a "group" "pat-
tern or practice" the court of appeals rejected two arguments
which, had they been sustained, would narrow the authority of
the Attorney General to bring suit under this section. In United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc. t03 the Department of Justice
brought suit against five Atlanta, Georgia, real estate brokers for
95. Id. at 781.
96. Id. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Fair Housing Act on thirteenth
amendment grounds.
97. United States v. Reddoch, Civil No. 6541-71-P (S.D. Ala., Jan. 27, 1972).
98. Id. at 24-26.
99. Id. at 29.
100. 341 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
101. Id. at 896.
102. Id. at 905, quoting United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221,
227 (5th Cir. 1971).
103. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
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blockbusting activities. 04 Of the five original defendants, two
signed consent decrees, the case against a third was dismissed,
and the remaining two proceeded to trial. 05 Following district
court decisions against the defendants, 0° they appealed arguing
that the Attorney General had standing to sue a "group" only on
a showing that each member of the group was engaged in an
"individual" "pattern or practice" and that the Attorney General
must prove either a conspiracy or concerted action on defendants'
part. The Fifth Circuit rejected both arguments, saying: "Block-
busting by its very nature does not require concerted action or a
conspiracy to wreak its pernicious damage. There is, for exam-
ple, no need for XYZ Realty to conspire with ABC Homes to set
off a pattern or practice of activities violating the act."'17 The
court stated that ". . . when a number of individuals utilize
methods which violate § 3604(e)" a pattern or practice has been
established."8
It is also important to note that while "pattern or practice"
inherently connotes more than one act, a single act violative of
Title VIII is a sufficient basis for a suit if it works a denial of the
rights of a group of persons and raises an issue of general public
importance. 09 Particularly significant in this context is the use of
statistical evidence, such as the number of rental units available
and the percentage rented to blacks compared to the percentage
of black residents in the vicinity, to establish that an injunction
should issue."0 Since in a suit for an injunction by the Attorney
104. Id. at 117.
105. Id. at 118.
106. United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476 and 335 F. Supp. 1004 (N.D. Ga.
1971); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487 and 335 F. Supp.
1004 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
107. 474 F.2d at 124.
108. Id.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 210 (1972), where, writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Douglas erroneously
states that the Attorney General may sue "only to correct a 'pattern or practice' of housing
discrimination." Clearly the correct reading of the statute is to regard the circumstances
under which the Attorney General may sue as alternatives rather than as branches of the
same tree: "[A] pattern or practice or resistance is not an indispensable prerequisite for
relief. Relief may be based on a single (unintentional) violation of the Act when by that
violation a group of persons are denied their statutory rights and the case raises an issue
of general public importance." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 218 n.17 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
110. A showing that no apartment has been rented to a black, despite a significant
number of blacks in the area and a number of applications, strongly suggests discrimina-
tion, and courts may accept such evidence as a rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., United
States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 782 (N.D. Miss. 1972) [quoting United
States v. Reddoch, No. 6541-71-P (S.D. Ala., Jan. 27, 1972) aff'd, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
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General there is no question of individual injury or relief, the
courts would be able to enjoin the defendant on the basis of
statistical evidence indicating that an issue has been raised as to
possible discriminatory practices.'" Thus a court could order
compliance and retain jurisdiction without a showing of a motive
or intent to discriminate.
The Attorney General has also successfully enjoined the pub-
lication of discriminatory advertisements in a newspaper, prohib-
ited by section 3604(c). The advertisement in question appeared
in the Courier, a paper in Prince George's County (Maryland)
with a circulation of approximately 29,000, and offered a base-
ment apartment "in private white home.""' 2 The court of ap-
peals, affirming the district court, characterized the issue as one
of general public importance, since the decision would set a pre-
cedent for all other newspapers. The court declared newspapers
not exempt from prohibitions of the Act"3 and denied injunctive
relief only on the ground of promised future compliance by the
defendant."'
The combined federal policy of Title VIII and section 1982:
Standing
The question of who has standing to protest discrimination
in housing has regularly been before the federal courts."' Stand-
ing is of particular importance in the housing area. While a black
who is denied access to housing can sue for damages and injunc-
tive relief, in many cases it is the continuing residents of a partic-
ular building or neighborhood who have the greatest "stake" in
enforcement of the fair housing laws. Citizen groups seeking to
stabilize racial balance in a changing neighborhood"' have the
1972) at 22-23: "'[in cases of racial discrimination, statistics often tell much and courts
listen.' "J [quoting United States v. Hinds County Bd. of Educ., 417 F.2d 852 (5th Cir.
1969) at 858: "'Nothing is emphatic as zero.' "J.
111. This would, in effect, shift the burden of proof to the defendant to come forward
and demonstrate that this conduct was not discriminatory. See note 20 supra and accom-
panying text.
112. United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529, 530 (D. Md. 1971), afJ'd, 459 F.2d
205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
113. 459 F.2d at 213.
114. The court of appeals determined that there was no violation of the first amend-
ment's guarantees since the context was commercial and the first amendment applies only
to "freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion." Id. at 214.
115. See discussion supra in regard to the standing of whites to protest violations of
the blockbusting section. See also United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty Inc., 474 F.2d
115, 125 (5th Cir. 1973), where the court rejects the contention that the Attorney General
would lack standing unless he could show a conspiracy or other concerted action.
116. Two examples are Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc., operating in the greater
1973]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
interest in and knowledge of the situation over a period of time
that is needed to substantiate charges of blockbusting, illegal
solicitation, or other discriminatory real estate practices. Simi-
larly, white residents in new suburban housing developments and
tenants in apartment complexes are frequently in a position to
discern a pattern of regular discouragement of black applicants,
which a particular black might not choose to litigate. A black
seeking to rent or to buy presumably has the need for suitable
housing uppermost in his mind; but the white residents, observ-
ing the situation and desiring to enforce the fair housing laws, are
in a position to bring suit even if the black chooses not to.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Trafficante v. Metro-
politan Life Insurance Co. "I granted standing to a white resident
suing under Title VIII in this kind of situation. Plaintiffs, black
and white residents of a large San Francisco apartment complex,
brought separate suits for alleged violation of section 3610. In a
unanimous decision granting standing to the white tenant, the
Court said that the injuries alleged by plaintiff' placed him
properly within the "persons aggrieved" authorized by the statu-
tory language to bring suit."' Relying in part on the interpretation
of "persons aggrieved" by HUD (which accorded whites standirg)
and in part on the legislative history, the Court stated, "While
members of minority groups were damaged the most from dis-
crimination in housing practices . . . those who were not the
direct objects of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair
housing, as they too suffered."' 20
The plaintiff in Trafficante also alleged a cause of action
under section 1982, but the Court, having granted standing under
Title VIII, did not reach this question.' 2' However, other federal
courts have granted standing to whites in suits brought under
section 1982. In Walker v. Pointer a white tenant sued to protest
Baltimore area, whose activities are more fully explained at note 23 supra, and Shaker
Communities, Inc., of Shaker Heights, Ohio.
117. 409 U.S. 205 (1972), rev'g 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971).
118. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been injured in that "(1) they had lost the
social benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and
professional advantages which would have accrued if they had lived with members of
minority groups; (3) they had suffered embarrassment and economic damage in social,
business, and professional activities from being 'stigmatized' as residents of a 'white
ghetto.'" 409 U.S. at 203.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 210.
121. Id. at 209 n.8. See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, indicating
that he finds the statutory language persuasive, but would have "great difficulty" granting
standing absent it. Id. at 212.
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her eviction alleging that defendant sought eviction after discov-
ering that the tenant entertained black friends. Stating, "[T]he
first six words of section 1982 appear to lead inescapably to the
conclusion that the statute contemplates a reach as broad as the
amendment upon which it is based," the court held that relief
was available to a white victim of discrimination against
blacks. 2 '
The Supreme Court had granted standing to a white plaintiff
in an earlier section 1982 suit, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park.1 13
In that case, Sullivan, a white, protested the refusal of the defen-
dant corporation to admit Freeman, a black and also a plaintiff,
to its park and swimming pool facilities; Sullivan was in turn
expelled from the corporation. The Court held that "there can be
no question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this ac-
tion."'' 4 If the expulsion of Sullivan were effective "Sullivan
[would be] punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minori-
ties protected by § 1982. Such a sanction would give impetus to
the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property. . . . The
white owner is at times 'the only effective adversary' of black
citizens' rights.' '2 5
These decisions are well suited to implementing the national
policy, for they grant standing to any person seeking to remedy
the wrong done by conduct violative of national legislation and
policy. The Trafficante decision would seem to indicate that a
white suing to enforce Title VIII would have standing any time
he could allege injury to himself as a consequence of the discrimi-
natory conduct of the defendant. This, then, would include plain-
tiffs injured in the following situations without regard to whether
plaintiffs were white or black: a white buyer, seeking to buy a
house in an integrated neighborhood, is refused a mortgage be-
cause the neighborhood is transitional; white buyers, seeking
housing but unfamiliar with various city neighborhoods, are
"steered" into integrated or transitional neighborhoods; white
home owners, anxious to stabilize the racial balance in their
neighborhood before the "tipping" point is reached, 26 realize that
real estate agents are no longer showing white buyers the avail-
122. 304 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
123. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
124. Id. at 237.
125. Id., citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 (1953).
126. The "tipping" point is the percentage of black residents which will effectively
discourage whites from moving into the neighborhood at all, thus guaranteeing an all-
black neighborhood.
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able houses in their neighborhood; white home buyers in new
residential areas are given financing on terms much more attrac-
tive than those offered potential black buyers, thus tending to
make the development all-white. In all of these situations, suits
by whites are justified by the terms of the law. To the extent that
funding and staffing of the Department of Justice housing inves-
tigation section is not adequate to police housing practices on a
nationwide basis, suits by interested whites are the next best
enforcement mechanism and should be as widely authorized as
possible.
MARYLAND FAIR HOUSING LAW
Provisions of the Law: The Maryland Human Relations Commis-
sion
The provisions of state fair housing law, and the proce-
dures whereby these provisions are enforced, are of particular
importance and significance since, under federal law, all adminis-
trative enforcement in the housing field is referred to the state if
the state has equivalent substantive provisions. 7 Maryland's law
has in the past been deemed "substantially equivalent"; 28 thus,
at present the state Human Relations Commission is the only
official administrative agency enforcing the law in Maryland.
The Human Relations Commission (hereinafter referred to
as HRC) was created in 1963 and was charged with enforcement
of laws barring discrimination in public accommodations. 2 9
Later legislation added responsibilities in the areas of discrimina-
tion in employment'30 and, most recently, in housing. 3' The pres-
ent Fair Housing Law declares the policy of the state to be "to
provide for fair housing throughout the State of Maryland, to all
its citizens, regardless of race, color, religion or national origin;
and to that end to prohibit discriminatory practices with respect
127. See text accompanying notes 61 and 69 supra.
128. MD. COMM'N ON HuMAN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1973). For the proce-
dures used by HUD in making this determination, see HUD, Recognition of Substantially
Equivalent Laws, 24 C.F.R. § 115.12 (1973).
129. Ch. 550, § 1 [19631 Md. Laws 981 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 1
(1972)), ch. 227, § 1 [1963] Md. Laws 402 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 11
(1972)).
130. Ch. 717, § 1 [19651 Md. Laws 1043 (codified at MD. ANN, CODE art. 49B, § 17
(1972)).
131. Ch. 324, § 1 [19711 Md. Laws 652 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 21
et seq. (1972)). Maryland's first discrimination-in-housing subtitle, ch. 386 § 1 [1967]
Md. Laws 767, failed at referendum on Nov. 5, 1968.
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to residential housing by any person or group of persons . . ,.3.
The Fair Housing Law generally parallels Title VIII in de-
scribing unlawful conduct. Prohibited are discrimination by re-
fusal to sell, or to rent, or to negotiate for the sale or rental; in
advertisements; in access to real estate brokerage services. 33 Fi-
nancial institutions are forbidden to discriminate in the financing
of home purchasing or rennovation13 1 Blockbusting and solicita-
tion (if "for the purpose of changing the racial composition of the
neighborhood") are also prohibited, whether or not the person is
acting for monetary gain. 35
While the conduct made illegal is thus generally similar to
Title VIII prohibitions, the enforcement provisions are dissimilar.
Under state law, the person aggrieved has no private right of
action: he must file a complaint with the HRC. 3 1 The staff of
HRC then investigates, and, if it finds "that there is prob-
able cause for believing a discriminatory act has been . . . com-
mitted," the staff "shall endeavor to eliminate the discrimi-
nation by conference, conciliation and persuasion.'" 137 If no agree-
ment is reached, HRC proceeds to hold a public hearing, and if
after the hearing the Commission "finds that the respondent has
engaged in any discriminatory act" it shall issue "an order requir-
ing the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory
acts and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the
purposes of the particular subtitle.' ' 31 If respondent refuses to
obey the order, HRC is authorized to institute litigation to en-
132. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 21 (1972).
133. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22 (1972).
134. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 23 (1972).
135. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22A (1972): see also the parallel provisions in MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, §§ 230A-230B (1972), which impose criminal sanctions (both fine and
imprisonment) on any person found to be in violation of these sections. Section 230A was
challenged on constitutional grounds in State v. Wagner, 15 Md. App.'413, 291 A.2d 161
(1972). The court upheld the validity of the provision and specifically the wording
"whether or not acting for monetary gain," saying:
Interpreting Section 230A as it was intended by the Legislature, nothing in its
provision makes mere speech unlawful; the statute does not inhibit the expression
or dissemination of ideas connected with a course of lawful conduct .... [T]o
the extent that the 'practice' of 'blockbusting' involves the making of such prohib-
ited representations, they are clearly beyond the protection of the First Amend-
ment.
Id. at 423, 291 A.2d at 166.
136. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 12(a) (1972). Under section 12(b) the Commission
may, upon receipt of reliable information, investigate the allegedly discriminatory prac-
tice, and on its own motion issue a complaint.
137. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 13(b) (1972).
138. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14(e) (1972).
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force the order. 31 In practical operating terms, once HRC receives
a complaint, the staff begins an investigation to determine
whether or not there is probable cause. If the staff member con-
cludes that there is, efforts are made to obtain voluntary compli-
ance. Should these efforts fail, the Commission then proceeds to
hold a public hearing.'40
In some ways the Maryland Fair Housing Law is superior to
federal law. HUD, after making an investigation and attempting
conciliation, has no power to issue cease and desist orders; HRC
does. HUD cannot convert complainant's grievance into its own;
HRC can. HUD is under the 180 day statute of limitations applic-
able to all of Title VIII; the Maryland law has no statute of
limitations.
But there are other significant points of departure. While the
powers of HRC parallel those of HUD under Title VIII, Title VIII
in addition provides two alternative modes of enforcement or
remedy-the private right of action and enforcement by the At-
torney General. Under Maryland law, the aggrieved party has no
option of proceeding directly to court; he must file with HRC.
Additionally, it is not at the present time clear that a suc-
cessful complainant suing under the Maryland Fair Housing Law
can recover attorney's fees and monetary damages.' 4' While theo-
retically the HRC process does not make it necessary for the
person discriminated against to retain private counsel, in practice
he may find this desirable, and he should not have to risk incur-
ring significant legal expenses in enforcing the state law.'
The most significant feature of the state law is its reliance
on the administrative procedures and on the agency to enforce the
law. The commission-as-enforcer'4 3 idea is appealing for two
reasons. First, responsibility for obtaining compliance with the
law is centralized in an administrative body, staffed by persons
familiar with housing laws and practices. Second, and possibly
even more important, a commission provides the citizen with
139. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 15(a) (1972).
140. MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 14 (1972).
141. "It is essential for the enforcement of civil rights law to have an award of
monetary damages." Interview with Philip J. Tierney, General Counsel, Maryland
Human Relations Commission, in Baltimore, Nov. 22, 1972. In Lord v. Malakoff, Civil
No. 52005 (Law) (Prince Georges County Circuit Court), the court awarded plaintiff $1500
for humiliation. This case is now on appeal, and Mr. Tierney recommends that, should
the award of damages be reversed, the statute be amended to explicitly provide for the
recovery of damages by the person injured.
142. See notes 34 through 49 and 73 through 74 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 72 supra.
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an officially constituted body whose duty is to remedy the
situation if the citizen has been wronged. This is potentially very
powerful. A person who suspects he has been discriminated
against may not desire or be able to afford consultation with a
lawyer. Additionally the lawyer with whom such person might
consult may or may not be familiar with the laws, procedures,
and evidentiary requirements in the housing area.
But while administrative investigation and conciliation may
be well adapted to ascertaining the facts and to involving the
state in enforcement of civil rights, these advantages may be
outweighed by the length of time which passes before an ag-
grieved person obtains a remedy. This problem is particularly
acute in the housing area. Discrimination in public accommoda-
tions or employment can be corrected by an order to comply in
the future, but in the housing area orders affecting only the
future are of little value. For example, if HRC were to order a
large developer or a real estate broker to comply with the law in
the future, it is possible that housing previously available only
to whites would become available to blacks. But HRC acts in
response to an individual complaint, and the black complainant
who is refused the only available rental unit in an apartment
building, which is rented the next week to a white, is left with-
out housing and without an effective remedy under state law.
By the time HRC has investigated and scheduled the appropriate
conciliation meetings and hearings, the complainant may have
long since lost interest in obtaining the specific housing unit
under discussion. While under state law HRC may seek judicial
relief on behalf of the complainant, the complainant himself has
no private right of action. Although the complainant has alterna-
tive and more immediate procedures available under federal
law,' he may not know this. Moreover, since all complaints
made to the federal agency are automatically referred to the
state, he may never be advised of other available procedures.
With these generalized criticisms of the administrative en-
forcement procedure and the limitations inherently placed on an
administrative agency in mind, consider the record of HRC. The
Housing Division has been in operation for approximately two
years and has received 542 complaints.' Of these, 365 were re-
ferred by HUD, and the remainder were filed directly with the
144. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
145. Letter from Philip J. Tierney to the writer, Aug. 21, 1973, on file with Maryland
Law Review [hereinafter cited as Letter of Aug. 21, 1973].
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Commission. 4 ' Almost ninety percent of the complaints charged
denial of access to the housing unit, an additional five percent
concerned denial of benefits (discriminatory eviction, exclusion
from swimming pools), and the remaining five percent included
all other illegal activities.'47 Two-thirds of all complaints con-
cerned rental units, the remaining one-third, sales. 48 Of the total
number of complaints filed, voluntary compliance has been ob-
tained in only forty-two cases, although there have been sixty-
three conciliation conferences.'49 Additionally, twelve public
hearings have been held, and litigation has been started in six
cases.' 5 The Commission reports a current backlog of seventy-
seven complaints' 5' and estimates that this represents a delay of
six to seven months.' 52
An agency that obtains compliance less than ten percent of
the time is either receiving a large volume of spurious complaints
or is not responding quickly and efficiently to the complaints
filed. In the case of the HRC, the latter is more likely,5 3 indicat-
ing that HRC has been beset with staffing and personnel prob-
lems. Moreover, operations have been handicapped for many
months by staff vacancies and the absence of an Executive Direc-
tor. The recently named Executive Director, Elbert L. A. Guil-
lory,15" appears to be instituting more efficient methods and im-
proving the results.
In order for the entire Title VIII-state law administrative
enforcement mechanism to make a significant impact on discrim-
ination in the housing area, it is essential that the agency dealing
on a face-to-face and day-to-day basis with complaints and com-
plainants be responsive and effective in its actions. It would seem
that at the very least there is room for great improvement at the
Maryland Human Relations Commission, and until such im-
provement takes place, it is unlikely that state enforcement of
146. Id. See also MD. COMM'N ON HUMAN RELATIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 14-15 (1973).
147. Interview with Philip J. Tierney, General Counsel, Maryland Human Relations
Commission, in Baltimore, Nov. 22, 1972.
148. Id.
149. Letter of Aug. 21, 1973, supra note 145.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Telephone interview with Philip J. Tierney, General Counsel, Maryland
Human Relations Commission, in Baltimore, Aug. 27, 1973.
153. In the opinion of Mr. Tierney, a large number of complaints have been "admin-
istratively closed." This procedure is utilized when HRC cannot locate the complainant,
the complainant chooses not to press the complaint, or the complaint has become moot.
154. Baltimore Sun, June 2, 1973 B. 7 col. 6.
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fair housing laws will offer substantial relief for persons discrimi-
nated against.
The Real Estate Industry
While the prospective tenant often deals directly with the
owner or resident manager of an apartment building, prospective
home buyers and sellers are commonly brought together by a real
estate agent.'55 The agent thus occupies a unique position of
power.'56 First, the agent has access to information not directly
available to the public. Through the Multiple Listing Service, an
area-wide collection of information indicating availability, price,
and location of housing is at his disposal. Second, he recommends
terms, suggests agreements, advises on prices, and provides ex-
pert information on financing. The buyer who is unable to obtain
the cooperation and services of an agent will face serious obstacles
in seeing houses on the market, and will have to rely on his own
judgment and knowledge, without expert advice.
The history of discrimination in housing and the role of the
real estate industry'57 has not inspired confidence that the indus-
155. "Realtor" is the registered trademark of the National Association of Real Es-
tate Boards. In Baltimore, "Realtor" has come to indicate a white real estate agent, and
"Realtist" a black real estate agent.
156. SPECIAL COMM. ON REAL ESTATE PRACTICES, REPORT TO MD. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
4-5 (1971).
The Committee believes that the following comment about a 'Realtor' by a re-
spected broker describes the impact on the public of most active real estate practi-
tioners:
"It is the expertise of the Realtor that has contributed immeasurably to the institu-
tion of real property as we know it in this country today.
"For instance, it is Realtors who counsel newlyweds on perhaps their most signifi-
cant investment, a house; ....
"Moreover, it is their planning that has contributed directly to housing trends, new
communities and even new cities.
"Thus, they have acted as developers, counselors, financiers and sociologists.
"... they have a role in almost every type of real estate transaction ....
"In working with a couple seeking shelter, it is Realtors who can best evaluate
whether it is better in a particular situation to buy or rent, how much mortgage is
affordable and where mortgage money can be found.
"On the other hand, they can advise couples wishing to sell their homes on ways of
making them more marketable and obtaining qualified buyers quicker.
"And these are but a few of the services Realtors provide ... ."
The Committee, chaired by Senator John Carroll Byrnes, included Senators Rosalie S.
Abrams, Robert L. Dalton, and Robert A. Pascal, and Delegates Ann R. Hull, Robert E.
Latshaw, Jr., and S. Frank Shore. The Report may be obtained from Senator Byrnes'
office, and is hereinafter cited as the Byrnes Rept. (1971). See generally Chapman, The
Real Estate Broker and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, 45 L.A.B. BULL. 475 (1970); Note,
The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969
DUKE L.J. 733.
157. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1358, S. 2114, and S. 2280 Before the 90th Cong., 1st
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try Will cooperate in bringing a speedy end to discriminatory
practices. Until 1950 the Code of Ethics required that every agent
promise not to show or to sell houses to anyone whose color was
not compatible with that of his potential neighbors.15 Even after
this rule was changed, the idea was firmly implanted in the minds
of brokers and their staffs that integrating a neighborhood would
result in unpleasant consequences both for the neighborhood and
for themselves.'59 Brokers, fearing a decline in property values
and a corresponding decline in commissions, and anticipat-
ing retribution from angered whites no longer willing to list,
claimed that they were merely showing their clients housing de-
manded by the client. Hence, such attitudes have hindered vol-
untary compliance with fair housing ideas and laws.
At the present time, both federal and state laws prohibit
discriminatory practices in real estate brokerage activities. Under
Title VIII, an owner of a single-family home, exempt from the
provisions of the Act, loses his exemption if he uses the services
of a real estate firm.' Section 3606 makes it unlawful for the
broker to discriminate in the access to or provision of his serv-
ices."6 ' Under the authorization of section 361362 the Department
of Justice has investigated the practices of at least two Baltimore
area real estate firms, and they have entered into consent de-
crees'6 13 under which they have adopted remedial hiring and edu-
cational programs and have agreed to abide by the law in the
future. Under these orders, the firms have agreed to hire black
agents and salesmen; to make listings and services available on
a non-discriminatory basis; and to hold training programs for all
personnel to advise them of the requirements of the law and of
their duties and obligations under it. Thus, it seems somewhat
more likely that a black buyer looking for suburban housing today
Sess., at 403 (1967); 45 L.A.B. BULL. 475 (1970) at 475-76; 1969 DUKE L.J. 733 (1969) at
739-40.
158. 45 L.A.B. BuLL. at 476. See also D. McENTmE, RESIDENCE AND RAcE (1960) at
238-50.
159. See, e.g., Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of Chicago, 36 Il1. 2d 530, 224 N.E.2d
793 (1967).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1970).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 3606 (1970).
162. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970).
163. Consent decrees have been signed by Donald R. Grempler Realty, Inc., and
Piper & Co., two of metropolitan Baltimore's largest real estate firms. Copies of the
consent decrees may be found in the Prentice-Hall "Opportunity in Housing" looseleaf
reporting service, July 25, 1972. The newspaper advertisements placed by these realtors
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will be treated more fairly than he or she was two years ago.
Under Maryland law, the Real Estate Commission is em-
powered to revoke or suspend the license of any licensee who is
found to be in violation of the provisions regulating real estate
services.'64 Included in the relevant article in the Maryland Code
are sections prohibiting: 65
Knowingly inducing or attempting to induce [a person to
sell, or] discouraging another person from purchasing [by
representations] regarding the existing or potential proxim-
ity of real property owned. . . by a person of any particular
race . . . or representing that the existing or potential prox-
imity will or may result in: 1. The lowering of property val-
ues; 2. A change in the racial, religious, or ethnic character
of the block, neighborhood or area. . . . 3. An increase in
criminal or antisocial behavior. . . or 4. A decline in quality
of the schools serving the area.
Also prohibited are "blockbusting," whether or not for profit,' 6
and solicitation for the purpose of changing the racial composi-
tion of the neighborhood.' 7
The real estate industry has increasingly been involved in
fair housing controversies as discriminatory practices become
more subtle and the attempts to prohibit them become more
sophisticated. Because of the industry's unique position of
power,'68 fair housing groups in particular have attacked broker-
age practices and have focused attention on further regulation
and supervision of the industry as a means to achieve the goals
already expressed in fair housing laws.
state that "[the realtor] is an equal housing opportunity agency." The realtors are also
authorized to display the logo contained in 24 C.F.R. § 110 (1973):
EQUAL HOUSINGOPPORTUNITY
164. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 224 (1972).
165. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56 § 224(v) (1972).
166. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230A (1972). See note 135 supra, discussing recent
judicial treatment of this section.
167. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230B (1972).
168. See note 156 supra and accompanying text.
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Critics of this tactic, both within and without the industry,
have responded that the industry "is being made a 'scapegoat' or
a substitute 'bad guy' for the unexpressed fears of whites in inte-
grating areas."'' 9 However, a study committee of the Maryland
legislature reached a different conclusion: 17 0
The evidence convinces us (testimony to this effect came
consistently from black and white -residents) that they know
from experience or observation that neighborhood after
neighborhood in the past went from all white to all black at
great economic and other disadvantage. . . .It is also a fact
.. . that the community concern does not develop at the
initial introduction of blacks into the neighborhood; rather
it develops when it becomes easily apparent that only certain
neighborhoods in the midst of many similar neighborhoods
of comparable housing values receive the attention of brokers
representing clients of a race and comparatively little atten-
tion by brokers representing buyers of another race.
The practices which led the legislative committee to this conclu-
sion are, as indicated previously, increasingly subtle. The solici-
tation of listings, apparently a standard and innocuous practice
in the state for many years,' takes on a new connotation if the
solicitation is made in a neighborhood undergoing racial
change.7 2 "Greeting cards," sent by a local real estate agent to
169. Byrnes Rept., supra note 156, at 13.
170. Id. at 14. (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 11-13.
172. See, e.g.,
HousES WANIED;
FAST ACTION - NO COMMISSION
ALL CASH PAID5
CALL NOW Z
FRIENDLY REALTY
0000 NORTH CHARLES ST ...... BALTIMORE, MD. 21201
123-4567
This realty company, a non-Maryland based firm, was the subject of an active effort by
local citizens' groups, primarily the Northeast Community Organization (NECO), who
succeeded in effectively ending the firm's operations in Baltimore City. See Baltimore
Evening Sun, Sept. 24, 1971, at C4, col. 5.; Baltimore Sun, Sept. 10, 1971, at C24 col. 5.
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everyone on the block, heralding the arrival of a new neighbor,
do not appear to be a friendly gesture if the new neighbor is the
first or second black family on the street.'73 "Steering," the prac-
tice of showing prospective buyers of only one color the listings
173. See, e.g.,
Your -. _
'1 New Neighbors
77 ~ To whom we have just sold
the home at
1000 Clobberies Rd.
It is our pleasure to introduce your new neighbors
Mr. & MrsJohn Doe
Name of
In selling this property, we contacted many familiesRealtor who wish to buy in your neighborhood. Are you in-
deleted terested in selling your property? We would welcome
the opportunity of consulting with you without any
obligation.
The same firm also sent notices to neighbors calling attention to availability of houses for
sale in the area.
HOUSE FOR SALE Date: Oct. 26, 1970
We have been selected to sell the house at:
911 KARLAT JR.
Before advertising this property for sale, we are asking those living in the vicinity
if they know of someone who would be interested in buying a home in the area.
You may have a friend or relative who is looking for a home nearby.
Please call us for information.
F
Name of
TO Mr. Niles Ellingeon Realtor
918 Marlau 
Dr.
L Balto., Md. 21212 
deleted
See Baltimore Sun, Sept. 10, 1971, C24 at col. 5. The practices of this particular firm led
to a request by the Department of Justice that the Federal Bureau of Investigation "...
initiate a thorough investigation of the allegations regarding [the firm] and some of the
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in a given neighborhood,' promotes resegregation, denying both
blacks and whites the opportunity of living in a stable integrated
neighborhood. "I
These practices have recently been under scrutiny by a state
legislative study group,' in an effort to determine what legisla-
tive modifications are needed to make unlawful those practices
which are not consistent with the state policy of fair housing.
"Steering" has received considerable attention, and the last two
sessions of the legislature considered but voted down proposals to
make "steering" explicitly illegal.'77 Efforts have also been di-
rected at the industry itself, with particular attention to increas-
ing the level of "professionalism" by requiring more training and
higher standards for licensees.' It has also been suggested that
the Real Estate Commission, charged with broad supervision of
licensing and ethical practices within the industry, be made more
responsive to the general public through the introduction of non-
other firms .. "See letter from Jerris Leonard, Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights
Division, to Northeast Community Organization, Feb. 25, 1971.
174. See notes 181 through 182 infra and accompanying text.
175. See Byrnes Rept., 1971 at 9:
[11n the areas studied in Prince George's County, . . . the complaint of the
residents, black and white, who testified against steering practices . . . identified
a . ..major consequence-one that is even more troublesome and threatening to
the future of our society-the collapse of multi-racial housing patterns. In these
areas of our state, the residents, black and white, testified that they were being
denied the opportunity to experience a multi-racial housing pattern. They were
concerned, not with economics, but with the spirit of multi-racial housing. Black
citizens moved into an integrated community which accepted them, and a balance
was struck to the satisfaction of all residents. There was repeated testimony of a
subsequent pattern of showing homes first to a disproportionate number of black
prospective purchasers, and then to blacks only. This has led to a racial imbalance
which, in turn, fed a greater imbalance and so on, until resegregated neighborhoods
resulted which cheated both blacks and whites in the process.
See also the testimony before the Byrnes Committee by Bishop F. Joseph Gossman,
Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore for the Roman Catholic Church:
If the real estate industry could be persuaded to abandon the practice of steering
their clients into racially segregated neighborhoods, there would be a much better
chance of real integration in our metropolitan housing area. Under present prac-
tices, however, the evils of segregation are encouraged and perpetuated by some
members of the real estate industry.
Testimony given Oct. 6, 1971, at 2.
176. See Byrnes Rept. (1970), note 156 supra.
177. See S.B. No. 17, introduced by Senator Byrnes, Jan. 19, 1973; this bill passed
the senate, but failed in the house of delegates, apparently a victim of a desire to "get
even" with Byrnes for his earlier votes. See The Sunday Sun, Apr. 1, 1973, A 20, col. 6.
See also SPECIAL COMM. ON REAL ESTATE PRACTICES, FIRST SupP. REP. TO MD. LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL, June 15, 1972, at 5, referring to the defeat of S.B. No. 316, introduced in the
1972 session [hereinafter cited as Byrnes Rept. (1972)].
178. Byrnes Rept. (1971) at 1-4; Byrnes Rept. (1972) at 2.
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industry associated members and through increased powers to
issue direct orders suspending licenses for violation of the law.', 9
Recently, for example, the Commission was empowered to order
a ban on solicitation in designated areas if it would be "...
damaging to the public or to the dignity and integrity of the real
estate profession, or could otherwise be in violation of [the] stat-
ute . . . . "1u Further efforts on the part of the industry itself
would obviously be of enormous value and impact in achieving
the goal of fair housing practices. However, it is not yet clear that
either the Commission or the industry in general sees its role as
one of promoting cooperation and compliance; rather, past per-
formance indicates that legislation prohibiting "steering" and
other evasionary devices will be necessary in order to bring mean-
ing to fair housing law.
CONCLUSION
The problems of access to housing still divide, in Baltimore
in 1973, along black-white lines: a true "open" housing market is
not at hand. Blacks continue to encounter discrimination ' in
access to housing; whites are able to locate housing in "safe" all-
white areas; and the integrated area is pressured by "steering"
and the possibility of rapid resegregation.
In addition, both blacks and whites are to some extent cap-
tives of of their education, experience and prejudice. Blacks may
under some circumstances not recognize conduct as an act of
discrimination. 8 Even if the conduct is clearly discriminatory,
the person against whom it is directed may not recognize that
such conduct is against the law or may not know how to seek legal
redress. Once the administrative process is invoked, it may be
lengthy and tedious, and even unsuccessful. On the other hand,
misunderstanding and prejudice continues, since many whites
are firmly convinced that black buyers with adequate financial
resources do not exist,' 83 that rapid neighborhood deterioration is
179. Byrnes Rept. (1971) at 15-17.
180. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 230C (1972). The Real Estate Commission had appar-
ently issued a ban by reason of its own authority under Reg. 28 (See The Maryland Real
Estate Cromrn'r, Spring 1972, at 3) but implementation of this was enjoined in Cooper v.
Real Estate Comm'n (# 44055-A, Cir. Ct. of Baltimore City).
181. See Nitzberg, Discrimination Against Blacks in a Predominantly White Apart-
ment Development: July, 1972, (published by Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc.)
182. For example, blacks being "steered" into areas where all sales are currently
made to blacks; economic disqualification on apparently legitimate standards.
183. See D. Warfield and G. Laurent, A Study of the Economic Potential of Balti-
more Black Families for Living in the Suburban Baltimore Area, June, 1972. (published
by Baltimore Neighborhoods, Inc.)
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inevitable, that integration is, in sum, not "natural."
It is with these problems that the law must deal. The policy
of fair and open housing is explicitly stated, both in federal and
state law. The means of making that policy a reality are less
apparent. The federal courts have contributed responsible judi-
cial interpretation and supervision when suits are brought to
them. But the federal courts are not the most suitable primary
means of enforcement. The administrative agencies must adapt
their procedures and routine practices to the peculiar needs of the
housing field and at the same time promote education, among
both blacks and whites, in the substantive as well as procedural
aspects of the law. Citizen organizations must continue to moni-
tor the day-to-day situation on the local level and to call atten-
tion to any practices not consistent with the spirit of the law.
Finally, the legislature, especially on the state level, must re-
spond quickly to any indications that practices in any part of the
housing market are having the effect of skirting the requirements
of law and must make these practices, too, illegal. Continued,
vigorous support of all aspects of fair housing law by all branches
of the legal system would eliminate the "badges and incidents of
slavery," a goal which has so long eluded both blacks and whites.
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